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A RESPONSE TO
PROFESSOR VERNELLIA R. RANDALL'S
THE MYERS-BRIGGS TYPE INDICA TOR,
FIRST YEAR LAW STUDENTS AND PERFORMANCE
CYNTHIA

v. WARD*

Professor Vemellia Randall's study of the relationship
between personality type and law school performance addresses a very current and hotly debated question: Are law schools
doing the best possible job of educating their students? She
answers with a clearly articulated "no." 1 However, a complete
answer to this question necessarily engages broader scholarly
discussions over the role of law schools, and law practice, in
society.
Professor Randall sets forth two somewhat different
complaints about legal education. First, she argues that law
schools fail to communicate to students the essential elements
of a successful legal education and to teach them what it
means to "think like a lawyer."2 Randall attributes her own
high class rank in law school to the "significant advantage" she
enjoyed as someone who had previously learned to study
effectively. 3 Randall criticizes "[l]egal education's failure to
teach skills to [students possessing] varying levels of entering
abilities;" a failure that effectively requires students to "enter[]
with sufficiently high levels of the requisite skills so that the
legal educational system's failures minimally affect on their
success."4
Professor Randall's point is that law schools ought to be
willing and able to offer a successful education to students
who, unlike Randall and others who do well in the current
system, do not enter with high levels of such skills. Programmatically this argument would lend support to calls for more
remedial programs in the first year of law school, as well as
greater attention to basic writing, mechanical, and study skills,
in order to ensure that all students, whatever their entering
• Professor of Law, Arizona State University; J.D. Yale, 1991.
1
Vemellia R Randall, The Myers-Briggs Type lndicatur, First Year Law Students and
Perfarmance, 26 CUMB. L. REv. 63 ( 1995) (discussing author's observations of the "general
incompetency of the legal education system.")
2
/d. at 65.
5
/d. at 103.
4
/d. at 65-66.
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level of preparation, have the maximum chance to succeed at
learning to "think like a lawyer" within the framework of the
pedagogical status quo.
Randall's second argument, which appears to be the main
focus of her piece, can be distinguished from the first. Having
surveyed a first-year class at Dayton for the purpose of comparing students' scores on the MBTI personality test with their
first-year grades, she concludes that legal education "favor[s]
... a particular type" 5 of personality (not merely a high level
of previously acquired skills), namely persons whose scores on
the Myers-:-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) reveal them to be
"INTJs"-introverted (as opposed to extraverted), intuitive (as
opposed to sensing), thinking (as opposed to feeling), and
judging (as opposed to perceiving) .6
However, even assuming that Professor Randall is right on
both counts-that the best law students are those who have
acquired certain skills before law school, and that students
with INTJ personality types do better than others-why should
we care? Mter all, legal education is not an end in itself; it is
meant, in general, to prepare students for law practice in some
form. Thus, assuming threshold rules of fairness in law school
admissions (e.g., the admissions process does not exclude
minorities on the basis of their race or women on the basis of
their gender), any argument for changing law school pedagogy must be rooted in some claim about the nature of law
practice-for example, that law school insufficiently prepares
students for practice as it now exists, or that law practice itself
must be changed via the acceptance, cultivation, and graduation of different kinds of students as well as the hiring of
faculty possessing priorities, goals, and methods that would
help prepare students to make whatever changes to the
practice are seen to be necessary.
The first claim-that law schools should better prepare
students to take their places in law practice as we know it-has
been the basis for complaints by the practicing bar and some
academics that law schools are failing adequately to teach the
trade. This accusation has recently been set forth in the socalled MacCrate Report, which charges that legal education is
too theoretical and should focus less on abstract concepts and
more on "skills training" and early introduction of students

5
6

Id. at 103.
I d. at 102. I evaluate the legitimacy of this conclusion below.
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into real-world practice situations.' The argument here
accepts, in general, the existing power and role of the legal
profession, takes the position that law schools are the setvants
of law practice as it now exists, and concludes that legal
education ought more effectively and efficiently to serve the
current needs of the bar.
The second claim-that law practice must be changed and
that law schools can and should play a part in changing
it-engages feminist, critical race theory, and critical legal
studies critiques of legal education. Scholars in these areas
worry that the law and lawyers are serving elitist and oppressive
roles in society at large, and they would like to use law-school
education to change this. 8 Feminist scholars, for example,
have charged that the legal profession is essentially "male"
insofar as it celebrates adversarial process; abstract, rational
thought; and impartial judgment, while explicitly or implicitly
disparaging the more relational, particularistic, and empathic

7

Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, American Bar Association,

Repurt of the Task Furce on Law Schools and the Profession: Na7TOWing the Gap, Legal Education
and Professional Deve/Qpment-An Educational Continuum (Chicago, 1992) [MacCrate

Report]. The task force included six Jaw professors, eight deans, seven practitioners, and
five judges. Jonathan Rose, The MacCrate Repurt's Restatement of Legal Education: The Need
for Reflection and Horse Sense, 44 J. LEGAL Eouc. 548, 550 n.10 (1994). Professor Rose
points out that the MacCrate Report is the latest in a long series of studies of law-school
education and skills training. Rose, supra at 549, nn.6-7 (listing other well-known
studies). Professor Rose notes that the "heart and soul" of the MacCrate Report is its
Statement of Fundamental Lawyering Skills and Professional Values, which lists ten
fundamental lawyering skills that, the report concludes, law schools ought to emphasize
more strongly. Id. at 552-53.
In two recent articles judge Harry Edwards has advanced the claim that "many law
schools-especially the so-called 'elite' ones-have abandoned their proper place, by
emphasizing abstract theory at the expense of practical scholarship and pedagogy."
Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between LegalBducation and the Legal Profession,
91 MICH. L. REv. 34 (1992). Law-school education, charges Edwards, has become too
theoretical and should refocus its energies on training students for practice and on
hiring and developing law faculty who wish to do "useful" scholarship, "not to fight ivorytower conflicts that are irrelevant to the outside world." Id. at 38. See also Harry T.
Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession: A
Postscript, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2191 (1993) (further developing this argument). But see
Derrick Bell & Erin Edmonds, Students as Teachers, Teachers as Learners, 91 MICH. L. REv.
2025 (1993) (worrying that judge Edwards' recommendations will disadvantage scholars,
especially minority scholars, whose theoretical work raises important fundamental
questions about the structure of Jaw in our society).
8
See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Excluded Voices: New Voices in the Legal Profession
Making New Voices in the Law, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 29 (1987) ("The story of law in the
United States is largely a story about one group of people, middle to upper class white
males ... making law for all others in society.") See generally Duncan Kennedy, Legal
Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy, 32 J. LEGAL Eouc. 591 (1982); Duncan
Kennedy, How the Law School Fails: A Polemic, 1 YALE REV. L. & Soc. ACTION 71 (1970).
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thinking that is characteristic of women. 9 These scholars have
advocated structural changes in the profession including a deemphasis on competitive "win-lose" adjudication and more
reliance on noncombative acljudicatory methods such as
mediation. 10 They have also recommended that legal education offer more opportunities to students who want to learn
about such methods. 11 Similarly, critical race theorists have
argued that the legal profession is insufficiendy diverse and
have criticized law schools for failing to recognize and cultivate
minority students and faculty who will bring new perspectives--especially the perspective of economic and social
disadvantage-to a profession they see as composed too
heavily of society's elite. 12 Some of these arguments draw on
the foundational work of critical legal scholar Duncan Kennedy, who has repeatedly accused law schools of reproducing
and reinforcing social hierarchy via the instillation in students
of corrupt values. 13
Professor Randall's arguments for reform of legal education necessarily rely upon one or another of these foundational assaults on the law and legal practice. Why, for example, are
law schools wrong to insist that entering first-year law students
already possess a high level of certain basic skills? The discussion above makes clear that several answers are possible. First,
making unjustified assumptions about students' entering level
of skills might result in graduating law students who are
9

See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Porlia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women s
Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ. 39 (1985); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The
Comparative Sociology of Women Lawyers: The "Feminization • of the Legal Profession, 24
OSGOODE HALL LJ. 897 (1987); Robin West, jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV.
1 (1988).
10
See generally Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)Torls: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass
Turts, P(lWer, and Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE LJ. 848; Ruth Colker, Feminism, Theology, and
Aburtion: T(lWard Love, Compassion, and Wzsdom, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1011 (1989); MenkelMeadow, supra notes 8-9; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary
Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-opted or "The Law of ADR," 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1 (1991).
11
See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Women as Law Teachers: Toward the "Feminization • of
Legal Education, in EssAYS ON THE APPLICATION OF A HUMANISTIC PERSPECilVE TO LAW
TEACHING 16 (1981); Menkel-Meadow, supra notes 8-10.
12
See, e.g., Derrick Bell, The Supreme Court 1984 Term, Foreword: The Civil IUghts
Chronicles, 99 HAR.v. L. REv. 4, 39-57 (1985). See generally Derrick Bell, The Final Repurt:
Haroards Affirmative Action Allegury, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2382 (1989}; Richard Delgado, The
Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil /Ughts Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561
(1984) (charging that minority scholarship on civil rights issues is ignored by "inner
circle" of white males who dominate the field). For a discussion of the advantages to law
of minority viewpoints, see Mari Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the
Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989).
13
See generally Kennedy, supra note 8.
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unprepared for the rigorous writing and analytic demands of
law practice. Here the argument dovetails with that of the
MacCrate Report and would lead to the conclusion that more
basic skills and practical exercises ought to be offered at law
school in order more quickly and effectively to assimilate law
students into practice. However,justice-based arguments of the
kind that concern feminists and critical scholars might also
ground this type of recommendation. For example, due to
systemic societal disadvantage, it may be that women and
minorities who possess top-level intellectual abilities are
nevertheless relatively less well-trained, at pr~law educational
levels, than are white males. If this is the case it might become
a matter of justice, not merely efficiency, for law schools to do
their part in remedying this unfair treatment by making
available to female and/ or minority students training in the
basic skills required to function successfully in the law. 14
The important thing to note here is that proposals to
reform law school education via more skills training are
necessarily based upon some fundamental claim about the
nature of law practice.
Similarly, Professor Randall's second line of attack on legal
education-that it unjustifiably favors persons whom the MBTI
test would label introverted, intuitive, thinking, and judging-can also be employed in ways that either serve the legal
status quo or would lead to dramatic reform of the legal
system at large. Suppose it is true that legal education disproportionately rewards a certain type of personality. Again, why
should we care? One reason might be that other, non-INTJ
personality types-those that gravitate toward extraversion,
sensing, feeling, and/ or perceiving15-are equally (or more)
capable of "thinking like lawyers" and of successfully practicing
law as we know it. If this were true then a preference for the
INTJ type over the ESFP 16 type would reflect an error in
judgment that ought to be remedied in order to produce the
best possible set of practicing attorneys within the current
system of law. 17 But an argument of this kind necessitates the

14

Professor Randall appears to adopt this view. See Randall, supra note I, at 66 n.4.
See generally Randall, supra note I, for definitions of all the elements of the MyersBriggs Type Indicator.
16
In MBTI terminology, the acronym "ESFP" stands for Extraverted (as opposed to
· Introverted), Sensing (as opposed to Intuitive),.Feeling (as opposed to Thinking), and
Perceiving (as opposed to Judging). See Randall, supra note I, at 75.
17
See, e.g., Lani Guinier, et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women s Experiences at One Ivy League
15
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development of a strong connection between personality style
and success at law practice-a connection Professor Randall
never establishes. 18
At a more revolutionary level one might argue that legal
education's favoring of INTJs results in a legal system that
helps maintain the domination of elites over the poor, women,
and/ or minorities. If white males, for example, tend disproportionately to possess INTJ personalities while women and
minorities tend to fall into other categories, then the effect of
favoring INTJs over others would be to privilege white males.
Urging law schools to make room for other kinds of people
might then be a matter of remedying systemic iftiustice in the
law. Although Professor Randall does not explicitly draw them
out, certain parallels between relational feminist arguments for
law reform and the elements of the MBTI test might be very
relevant here. For example, if it is true, as Randall hypothesizes, that legal education currently favors "intuitive" personalities
over "sensing" ones, this could imply a bias toward abstraction,
toward rewarding students who prefer to deal in abstract
generalities rather than "personal, concrete experience. "19
Similarly, if law school (and practice?) favors "thinking"
students over "feeling" ones, this might imply a bias toward
impersonal, syllogistic thinking as opposed to thinking that
prioritizes human relationships, compassion, and the centrality
of individual values. 20 Some feminist scholars would add that
these biases have the effect of disadvantaging women-who,

Law Schoo~ 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 85-86 (1994) ("The law school's definition oflawyering
potential-as measured by a single evaluative methodology and a dominant pedagogy-may simply be outmoded in light of contemporary professional developments, which
include alternative dispute resolution, emphasis on negotiation rather than litigation,
and client counseling") (footnotes deleted); "[C]ooperative approaches to negotiation
not only are common in forums that emphasize mediation and alternative dispute
resolution, but also are associated with traditional advocacy." ld. at 96.
18
Beyond her merely conclusory statement that law practice needs all personality
types, see Randall, supra note 1, at 103.
19
/d. at 88, 90 ("intuitive law students tend to do well in law school because they excel
at theoretical topics and abstract theories"); I d. at 90 (identifying the "cognitive style"
of sensing law students as "staying connected to practical realities around them" and the
"study style" of sensing law students as "approaching abstract principals and concepts by
distilling them out of their own personal, concrete experience").
20
/d. at 91 (Noting that "thinking" law students are "syllogistic and analytic," and that
they "are likely to undervalue . . . the importance of human relationships in legal
problems ... and the art of communication."). "Feeling" students, on the other hand,
"need to be encouraged to keep that perspective," which focuses on the "human angle"
of law, "attending to relationships," and "personalizing issues and causes they care
about. n /d. at 92, 93, 95.
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whether because of socialization or biology, tend to emphasize
relationships, communication, the personal, and the practical
over impersonal, syllogistic abstraction. 21 Such critics would
conclude that, as a matter of equality and justice, law schools
must open themselves to new ways of thinking and learning. 22
Professor Randall's results offer little support for the idea
that law school systematically advantages white males over
women and persons of color. Consider the breakdown across
the four sets of opposing preferences that comprise the MBTI
test Randall gave to the first-year class at Dayton. The test
revealed that 51.3 percent of the students surveyed were
extraverts, while 48.7 percent were introverts. 23 That is, the
class appeared almost evenly balanced between introverts and
extraverts. The gender breakdown showed that 57.8 percent of
female students were extraverts, compared to 46.7 percent of
males-a difference that Professor Randall notes is not
statistically significant. 24 Similarly, 52.9 percent of students of
color were extraverts, compared with 51.1 percent of
whites-again, a difference that is not statistically significant.25
This even-handed breakdown was repeated along the
Sensing-Intuitive dimension, where 48.1 percent of students
preferred sensing, compared with 51.9 percent who preferred
intuition. Among students of color, 52.9 percent preferred
intuition over sensing, compared with 51.8 percent of whites;

21

See, e.g., Lani Guinier et al., supra note 17, at 3 (finding "strong academic
differencesM between male and female law-school graduates, with men performing
significantly better than women overall); "All women have finally been welcomed into
the Law School's hierarchy, but it seems that a significant number are welcome to stay
at the bottom. The combination of highly visible, competitive pedagogical strategies in
large first-year classrooms, peer hazing, and an institutionalized emphasis on replacing
emotions with logic and commitments with neutrality may be sufficient to socialize many
students into their place, even those who are trying to resist.M ld. at 71 (footnotes
omitted). "These data plead ... for a reinvention of law school, and a fundamental
change in its teaching practices, institutional policies, and social organization." I d. at
100.
22
It is probably important to note that the sort of group-based personality assignments
necessary to these arguments have come under increasing disrepute for making
illegitimately "essentialist" judgments about the viewpoints and characteristics of women
and minorities while ignoring the differences between group members. See, e.g., Angela
P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581 (1990).
However, relational feminists continue to do important work both in legal theory and
in practice-related scholarship. See generaUy supra notes 9-12.
2.!1 Randall, supra note 1, at 80.
24 /d.
25 ld.
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and 55.6 percent of males preferred intuition compared with
46.9 percent of females; again, neither of these differences was
statistically significant. 26
With respect to the Thinking-Feeling preference set, 77.9
percent of students overall preferred thinking, while 22.1
percent preferred feeling. Among the males surveyed, 82.2
percent preferred thinking, compared with 71.9 percent of the
females; and 94.1 percent of students of color preferred
thinking, compared with 75.9 percent of whites. Once again,
neither difference was statistically significant. 27
Finally, the judgment-Perception preference set produced
somewhat different results along the gender dimension.
Overall, 67.5 percent of students preferred judgment, compared with 32.5 percent who preferred perception. Of the
students of color, 64.7 percent preferred judgment over
perception, compared with 67.9 percent of whites (not a
statistically significant difference); but the male-female
breakdown did yield a statistically significant difference, with
78.1 percent of females preferring judgment, compared to
60.0 percent of males. 28 However, Professor's Randall's results
indicated that "[s]tudents preferringjudging had higher mean
FSGPA (2.568) than students preferring perception
(2.523), "29 and although this difference was not statistically
significant, "[t]he students' ... Uudgment-Perception] continuous scores decreased as their first semester grades increased. That is, the more the student preferred judgment, the better
the student performed. "30

26

ld. at 86.
/d. at 91-92.
28
ld. at 96-97. Professor Randall notes that the proportion of women law students
preferringjudgment is substantially higher than the percentage of women generally who
do so. Relational feminists would undoubtedly see this as a significant fact; if, for
example, it is "woman's nature" to prefer perceiving to judging, law schools may be
disserving women by preferring those who judge to those who perceive. However, this
immediately calls forth the standard arguments against relational feminism. What, for
example, are we to say about the first-year female law students who, by a significant
margin, prefer judging to perceiving? Are they not "real" women? But if your definition
of a "woman" is "someone who looks at the world in a relational, communicative,
perceiving (as opposed to judging) way,c then many biological females are not women,
while at least some biological males are (see Randall's results re: males who were
relational, etc.). In short, you are not talking about feminism anymore; you are simply
arguing for equal opportunity for relational, communicative folks. For further discussion
of that argument, see infra.
29
ld. at 97. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
50
ld. (emphasis added). The difference was not statistically significant.
27
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I am neither a psychologist nor a statistician and will
therefore not attempt to evaluate Professor Randall's methodology, the appropriateness of her choice of the MBTI test over
other personality tests, or the applicability of her findings to
students at other law schools. However, to the extent her
results do have general applicability they do not appear to
support claims that law-school education has the effect of
disadvantaging women and minorities. Randall's results
indicate that, along three of the four dimensions evaluated,
race- and gender-based differences were not statistically
significant. Further, along the fourth dimension-that of
judging v. perceiving, a statistically significant difference did
exist between men and women, with women significantly more
likely than men to prefer judging. However, as Randall
notes, 31 judging seems to be at least a somewhat favored
thinking style in the current law-school system, so this difference would, if accurate and generalizable, work to the
advantage of women.
All of which serves only to highlight the significance in law
school of personality differences considered apart from race
and gender. In other words, if it is true, as Professor Randall's
findings suggest, that INTJ's are favored over other personality
types in law school, should we care about this independently
of race and gender questions? The answer to that question, of
course, depends on what one expects law schools to be and to
accomplish. Is it the obligation of law schools, for example, to
make available a legal education to every person who wants
one? Or are there legitimate ways of screening out some
students in favor of others, either by denying admission to
some or by styling the law-school learning environment so that
certain kinds of persons will do better than others? 32 If so,
how do we decide whom to screen out; that is, what screening
criteria are legitimate? As the discussion above has indicated,
these questions are not answerable without some agreed-upon
conception of law school's proper relationship to practice, and
the proper nature of law practice itself. Those who seek
51

ld. at 97-98.
Professor Randall argues that the MBTI should not be used for admissions purposes,
since it does not measure or account for all the qualities that determine a particular
individual's law-school success. ld. at 102. But, if her results are reproduced and become
applicable to all law students and law schools, it is hard to see the justification for not
using them-in conjunction, of course, with all other legitimate factors used in the
admissions process-to help gauge each prospective student's potential success in law
school.
52
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merely to obtain students better prepared to practice law as we
know it might be well satisfied with the idea that it takes a
certain type of personality to do well in the legal profession,
and might want to use Professor Randall's data to seek more
accurate ways of identifying INTJs and recruiting them to law
school. On the other hand, those who feel that law school
should be preparing students to make law less adversarial,
hierarchical, and competitive, and more nurturing and
relational, will care very much that legal education rewards
and (to some extent) molds students into persons who prize
qualities such as impartiality, syllogistic logic, and abstract
generality over the more relational, communicative, particularistic approach that might make our law practice more communitarian and more attuned to the voices of the most disadvantaged. While Professor Randall's results offer an opportunity
to address the core question of whether we need basic reform
of law practice, they do not, by themselves, offer an answer to
that question.

